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GERMAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN TRANSITION 
-THE POLICY OF .UNITING VERSUS RADICAL UNION-
By Eiji OHNO* 
The motive from which I try, in this short paper, to analyse the 
Imperial German economic policy by placing Radical Union (Freisinnige 
Vereinigung) against the implementation of the "Policy of Uniting" 
(Sammlungspolitik) of the Imperial German regime and taking it up as a 
pivotal point for the discussion comes from the following three reasons: 
First, the two opposing patterns of the German bourgeoisie are well 
disclosed in the confrontation between them which developed in the 
process of their policy making which greatly influenced the historic 
destiny of Imperial Germany (1871-1918). The pro-Junker behaviour of 
the bourgeoisie belonging to the camp that promoted" Sammlungspolitik" 
was naturally different from the anti-Junker behaviour of those who 
opposed it. This difference was not only temporary limited to the short 
period at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century 
when the "Sammlungspolitik" was actively pursued, but it was also a 
phenomenon that typically took place persistently through out the Im-
perial German regime. I think this should not be overlooked'). 
Secondly, the viewpoint advocated by the circle of the Radical Union 
in criticizing "Sammlungspolitik" involves close study of the Imperial 
German economic policy as well as of the historical nature of her social 
structure that endowed the German bourgeoisie with its specific character 
and inherent nature. 
In the third place, it is because the writer is inclined to believe 
that it might be possible to see a driving force in the making that even-
tually brought about the Weimar Republic, in the course of the develop-
ment of the party line pursued by the Radical Union that went against 
the implementation of "Sammlungspolitik "". 
* Professor of Economics, Kyoto University. 
I) Refer to E. Ohno and K. Sumiya, .. Analysis of Gennan Capitalism and 'Capital Pattern' ", 
Pt. I, Thought (Shiso), No.2, 1964; .. On Definition hy Lenin of • Junker-Bourgeois' Cate-
gory ", Journal of Agrarian HistOTY (Tochiseidoshigaku), No. 17, 1962. 
2) Recall the views, for instance, as described on p. 59 of Carl E, Schorske, Gennan Social 
De'fTUJCraey, where it says that" a faint adwnbration of the later Weimar Coalition It can be 
recognized in the movements of Centrists, Progressives and Social Democratics who urged 
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Among these three reasons, this paper emphatically deals with typical 
characteristics of the German bourgeoisie, hence no analysis of the deve-
lopment of the political party called the Radical Union (Freisinnige 
Vereinigung) is intended to be made here. 
I The "Policy of Uniting" as an Economic Policy in Transition 
The social structure of Imperial Germany entered a transitional 
period with the withdrawal of Bismarck in 1890. For instance, Walther 
Lotz stated, in a paper contributed to the anthology issued in memory 
of Max Weber, that the resignation of Bismarck marked a turning-point 
in the entire political development of Germany as well as in her economic 
policy'" and paid his keen attention to the fact that the German econo-
mic policy faced thereby the point of decision whether or not it was to 
abandon Bismarck's policy directed at the protection of the class interests 
of Junkers. He pointed out, however, that even with the policy adopted 
by Ca privi and his successors no policy that was divorced from the basic 
principle of Bismarck's policy could eventualIy be practised; and that 
their efforts ended in a "compromise policy" that made concessions to 
the demands of the Agrarier (agrarians). But, that he took the withdra-
wal of Bismarck (1890) as the turning-point in Imperial German economic 
policy, and that he viewed the period from 1890 to the 1st World War 
as a "transitional age where a policy of compromise had to be introdu-
ced" filled with most difficult problems which need minute analysis'), 
interests us a great deal in the light of our approach to the subject. 
The social structure of the new German empire created in 1871 under 
the "Iron Chancellor" Bismarck, entered into the process of down-fall 
with his withdrawal in 1890, and it is understood that by the bourgeois 
reform and with the subsequent formation of the Weimar Republic, the 
regime that lasted nearly half a century ended5). Indeed, the social 
structure of Imperial Germany specified as "pseudo-Bonapartism "6) is found 
to have reached the crossroad in the 1890's'\ 
BUlow in 1906 to refonn their colonial administration, or that stated. on p. 326 of George 
W. F. Hallgarten, Imperialismus vor 1914, Bd. 2, 1951, where it is pointed out that a model 
of the Weimar Coalition is originally presented in "Kombination Bethmann" that made its 
appearance through the conversion of the Center Party subsequent to the fonnation of a 
left_wing block of the parliamental majority covering "from. Rebel to Bassermann" who 
proIllOted the passage of the bill of Imperial property increase tax during the Reichstag 
(Imperial Diet) of 1913. 
3) W. Lotz, Wandlungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben und Wandelungen in der deutschen 
Wirtschaftswissenschaft seit Bismarcks Riicktritt, in Hauptprobleme der So;:,iologie, Erinnerungsgabe 
fur Max Weber, Bd. 2, 1923, S. 311. 
4) Ibid., S. 313. 
5) H. Ohtsuka, "The Social Geneology of Modem Enterpreneurs", ;Business 'Review, Vol. 11, 
No.3, 1964, p. 10 f. 
6) M. Yamada, Analysis of Japanese Capitalism, Iwanami Shoten, 1934, "Introduction ", p. 2. 
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This historical sequence can be outlined, with particular attention 
paid to the embodiment of economic policy as follows: 
As counter-measures in the period of the "Great Depression" that 
started with the panic of 1873, various policies centering around the 
socialists suppression law, social insurance law and protective tariff policy 
initiated by Bismarck had been put into effect. The Protective Tariff 
Law which was passed in the Reichstag (Imperial Diet) of 1879, for 
instance, may be seen to have been intended for the common interests 
of the Junker class and the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie as illustrated 
by the alliance of "Corn and Iron "S) or the compromise between "Rye 
and Iron ".), though there had been tangled problems as to the economic 
interests of various social strata within them. In particular, the tariff 
rate of 10 marks per ton on wheat and rye imposed in 1879 which was aimed 
at the protection of the economic interests of the Junkers of East Elbe 
who were semi-feudal landowners, was gradually raised as the agricultural 
panic that underlied the "Great Depression" became serious, and in 1885 
the rate became 30 marks, then in 1887 it further went up to 50 marks. 
But, such a radical tariff policy for the protection of agriculture induced 
a retaliatory tariff policy against German industrial products on the part 
of such countries as Russia, at first, the U. S. A., Austria-Hungary, who 
were very much concerned with the export of their corn to Germany. 
This naturally resulted not merely in narrowing the export market for 
Germany, but also invited the lifting of domestic price levels for corn, 
which in turn raised the wages of workers. This meant that the inter-
nationally competitive power of an export industry based on cheap labour 
had been much reduced by that. Thus this protection policy for" Corn " 
had come to be a yoke as the demand for securing the world market 
became stronger, and finally with the withdrawal of Bismarck and with 
the subsequent emergence of Caprivi, "The New Course" (Der neue 
Kurs) was employed, whereby the tariff rate of wheat and rye was 
reduced to 35 marks per ton. 
Evidently, with the withdrawal of Bismarck, the conflict between two 
7) This particular point has been made clear by numerous labourious works such as K. Ohkouchi, 
History of German Thought on Social Policy, Nippon Hyoron Sha, 1936, p. 387; T. Yada, Age 
of Bismarck, in Formation of European Imperialism, Kawade Shobo, 1941, p. 151; T. Matsuda, 
"Establishment of Junker Administration and Middle~Class Peasants", Historical Review 
(Rekishi Hyoron) , Vol. 3, No.1, 1948, p. 52; B. Eguchi, .. Bismarck and Imperialism", Pt. 2, 
Historical Journal (Rekishigaku Kenkyu) , No. 144, 1950, p. 34; T. Murase, .. Problems of 
German Revolutionary History ", Shiso, No.2, 1957, p. 137; K. Hayashi, II Problems on the 
Fall of Bismarck ", Shigaku Zasshi, (Historical Journal), Vol. 67, No.2, pp. 46-57, etc. Further 
reference to these works is skipped here because of limited space. 
S) Jfugen Kuczynski, Die Bewegung deT deutschen Wirtschaft von 1800 his 1946, 1948, S. 208. 
9) Alexander Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy in Germany, 1943, p._ 45. 
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classes: the Junker class having had its dominant position still in politics 
and that of the bourgeoisie who had rapidly been gaining socio-economic 
power, was brought into prominence. 
This conflict became more and more serious during the "Great De-
pression" on account of the structual change that had been taking place 
in German capitalistic society: particularly by its rapid shifting to the 
stage of advanced monopolistic capitalism in West Elbe combined with 
the administrative crisis of the Junkers in East Elbe created under the 
impact of agricultural panic. J unker-Prussian rule was then precarious, 
because its foundation of Junker administration was on the verge of 
disintegration from the effects of agricultural panic. However, the emer-
gence of a camp which could overcome it was delayed. Thus after the 
policy of "Der neue Kurs" of Caprivi that could temporarily control the 
interests of the Junker class but soon faild, there came to take its place 
the "Sammlungspolitik" led by Johannes von Miquel and Karl F. von 
Stumm which aimed at "stabilization and new-equilibrium "10) of the 
Imperial German social structure. This was then in a shaky state, being 
urged by the roll-back movement of Junker class based on the Bund der 
Landwirte (the Farmers' League)") that succeeded in winning wide support 
from the peasantry. By the re-arrangement for the common interest of 
the Junker class and the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie at the meeting 
of the 19th and 20th centuries, the foundation for the internal government 
administration of " Junker-Bourgeois imperialism" came to be established, 
where a political system centering around the anti-subversion bill, fleet 
building policy and protective tariff policy were brought into being. 
Thus" Sammlungspolitik " intended not only for the prevention of 
disintegration of the authoritative-hierarchal social structure of Imperial 
Germany, but also for its reinforcement, could prove to be successful for 
the time being, while all the policies of this period had a certain internal 
relationship with" Sammlungspolitik". The inner connection between the 
legislation of the 2nd Fleet Law in 1900 and the Tariff Law of 1902 which 
constituted the two mainstays of "Sammlungspolitik ", had already been 
10) E. Kehr, .. Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik 1894-1901 ", Historische Studien, H. 197, 
1930, S. 264. 
11) The U Bund der Landwirte n (The Fanners' League) was not only organized in East Elbe 
but was rapidly extended to West Elbe and by 1900 the membership amounted to about 
200,000. Thus at the beginning of tbe 20th century it came even to be regarded as 
"marching together under the banner of Bund der Landwirte all the peasants except few" 
(Oskar Stillich, Die politischen Parteien in Deutschland, Bd 2, Der Liberalismu.r, 1911, S. 165). 
Thus the fact, that the Conservative Party infused with fresh ideas and the Center Party 
succeeded in winning the support of the old middle class of peasant fartne" as well as of 
handicraftsmen that faced destruction, was the important reason for the victoI)' of the camp 
who pushed ahead II Sammlungspolitik", to which it is worthwhile to pay sufficient attention. 
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analysed by Lotz while this policy was still in the course of being 
effected12), while Eckart Kehr laid the utmost emphasis on it13), and George 
W. F. Hallgarten too pointed it out"). Kehr in particular grasped the 
internal relation of the system of "Sammlungspolitik" on a wider basis 
and found its basic characteristic in that it "financed the fleet building 
by raising corn tariffs and combined agrarians and industrialists by mali-
cious measures to have them mutually guarantee the rule of their partners 
against the charge of proletariat "15). 
According to the analytical viewpoint of Kehr, the internal govern-
ment administration of Imperial Germany in the 1890's was regulated by 
two factors; (1) The struggle between industry and agriculture for the 
state hegemony in their respective efforts to improve their social position 
by taking advantage of state mechanisms, and (2) the struggle against 
the state and its social order by revolutionary proletariat. However such 
struggles were modified at the turn of the century (i) by the advance 
of the revisionism of Bernstein whereby revolution was replaced by evolu-
tion and (ii) in parallel with this, the era of the law against subversion 
came to an end on the part of the state and (iii) the struggle between 
Agrarier and industrialists came to be mediated by the "Sammlungspoli-
tik" of Miquel. Thus Kehr understood that these struggles were brought 
to an end by these three factors. 
In his understanding, however, the recognition of the mechanism of 
Junker-Prussian rule in the social structure of Imperial Germany and 
the subject of bourgeois reformation yet to be achieved is not necessarily 
clear16), while importance is definitely placed on the aspect of the alliance 
between Junkerdom and bourgeoisie in confrontation with the proletariat. 
We too would naturally not overlook such aspect, but we would like to 
stress at the same time that also, on the part of bourgeoisie, an anti-
Junker propensity to make alignment between labour and civilian de-
velops, in contrast with the pro-Junker line where it tends to be combined 
with the Junker class, the ruler of Imperial Germany, in vying against 
the proletariat. This report places major importance on figuring out the 
typical pattern of the German bourgeoisie as seen in the reflection of its 
two conflicting attitudes to the "Sammlungspolitik". 
12) VgI. W. Lotz, .. Die HandeispoIitik des Deutschen Reiches unter Graf Caprivi und FOrst 
Hohenlohe (1890-1900) ", Schrifeen des Vereinr fiir Soz;ialpolieik, Bd. 92, 1901, S. 191. 
13) E. Kehr, op. cie., S. 204 Anm.; E. Kehr, .. Englandhass und Weltpolitik n, Zeieschrift fur 
Polieik, Bd. 17, 1928, S. 517f. 
14) VgI. G. W. F. Hallgarten, op. cie., Bd. I, 1951, S. 412. 
15) E. Kehr, Schiachtfioeeenbau, S. 147. 
16) Refer, for example, to F. Engels, Criticism of the Draft of the Manifesto of the Social 
Democratic Party in 1891, in Selected Works of Marx-Engels, Japanese translation, Ohtsuki 
Shoten, Vol. 17, pp. 378, 384--385, 395. 
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n Basic Viewpoint in the CriticisDl on the "Policy of 
Uniting" by the Radical Union 
25 
Now, what kind of criticism was raised against" Sammlungspolitik " 
by the circle that supported the party line of the Radical Union (Frei-
sinnige Vereinigung) ? 
(1) The" Sammlungspolitik" found its first public expression when 
Finance Minister Miquel made a speech requesting the reorganization of 
the so-called" Agro-Industrial Alliance" on July 15, 1897, but in October 
of the same year, Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz, Professor of Freiburg 
University, gave a lecture in Karlsruhe on the subject of "Trade Policy 
and the Fleet" under the auspices of the Baden-Wiirttem berg Gospel-Social 
Society and also at the gathering in January of the following year in 
Mannheim sponsored by the Merchant Union, the Chamber of Com-
merce and the Directors Meeting of the Stock Exchange, he made a 
similar speech where he criticized" Sammlungspolitik ". 
According to his manuscript reprinted in the journal "Die Nation" 
which is the revision of his lecture, (a) he first pointed out that for 
the first time an economic policy antagonistic to the class interests of 
the Junkers of East Elbe was pushed ahead by the trade policy of Cap-
rivi, and praised the anti-Junker alignment between the bourgeoisie and 
labour achieved thereby. 
(b) Then he studied the problem of trade policy from the two 
aspects; the one from the internal structural change in the German 
national economy and the other from the change in its relation with 
world economy, and thus he took up the issue of shifting to a so-called 
"industrial state". In his opinion, whereas in West Elbe the pivotal 
interest is found in the "industrial state", in East Elbe the shifting to 
the" industrial state" still remains not to be achieved. Thus, an important 
problem is involved in that Germany has not been converted to a "indus-
trial state", but nevertheless, if the change in the relations of German 
national economy with world economy is questioned, her interest in the 
world economy should have a major bearing upon the German national 
economic interests. This is because of the fact that the export of German 
industrial products has already been playing a decisive role and that the 
shifting of Germany to an "industrial state" is a course that nobody 
can ever change"J. 
As seen above, Schulze-Gaevernitz maintains that one should face 
the fact that the German national economy has been integrated into the 
17) Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz. .. Handelspolitik und Flotte ", Sonderabdruek aus der 
Wochenschrift Die Nation, Jg. 15, 1898, 88. 6-11. 
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world economy as an "industrial state", and that the relation between 
the implementation of economic policy pursuing the consistent promotion 
of bourgeois interests as well as the establishment of civil liberty and 
the proposed reinforcement of the German fieet, is of reciprocity, and 
therefore to want only the latter and try to restrict the former, indues 
a total contradiction. From this standpoint he bitterly criticizes the fact 
that "Junkerdom tries to sell a retrogressive economic policy with naval 
and military voting, thus maintaining his conventional political power 
and postponing his loss of economic status "1", and thus directs his attack 
to the Junker class which blocks the German economic advance to the 
world market and which oppresses civil liberty. He warns that the con-
tinuation of political domination by big landowners in East Elbe will 
further aggravate the land restriction under the pressure of entailed estate 
(Fideikommiss) system, bring about land devastation and induce greater 
migration of Slav itinerant workers. Thus in his view the extensive ter-
ritory of East Elbe will come to face great danger from the viewpoint 
of the national interest. He thus concludes that though immediate trou-
bles may be patched up with makeshift counter-measures, sooner or later, 
an authentic and correct peasant policy should be worked out in the 
distribution of landed property, because the cause of all agricultural 
problems in East Elbe must be traced back thereto. He maintains that 
the correct policy towards the agricultural populace cannot be found so 
long as it is in line with Junkerdom, but is possible only when it is 
against Junkerdom as it was always so in the past. In this sense he 
objects that the policy deviates more and more from the right direction 
when the first step of a peasant-favouring policy must be directed against 
the entailed estate (Fideikommiss) system. 
(c) The camp to be regimented for" the uniting of emulators (Ge-
gensammlung) " along the anti-Junker line was, however, in the eyes 
of Schulze-Gaevernitz, in a condition to be worried about. He thus 
particularly directed his criticism to the oppression of civil liberties entai-
led by Junker-Prussian rule and to the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie 
that was prone to compromise with such a regime. He pointed out that 
by the pressure brought upon the peasants and civilians in East Elbe by 
the Junker class or by the denial of the right of organization of workers, 
the vast majority of the people were deprived of their civil freedom. 
This is illustrated by (1) the virtual lack of the right of assembly and 
organization in Hinterpommern and (2) that the upper-most stratum of 
the bourgeoisie in west and south Germany had often lost its enthusiasm 
\8) Ibid., S. 26. 
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to reach to the lower social strata by adapting itself to the dominant 
approach of the Junker type as seen in East Elbe. Thus such "Fabrik-
feudalen" (manufacturer-lords) tried to adopt a Junker style in their 
daily behaviour, as well as a Junker accent in their speech, to say nothing 
of their approach to politics and customs in their efforts to join the 
. ruling class. They abandoned their own bourgeois interests and drifted 
away from the active majority of the bourgeois class in west and south 
Germany19). 
According to his viewpoint, the favourite policy pursued in Germany 
towards her labour movement was the policy of large landowners in East 
Elbe as attested by the Prussian bill of 1897 for the regulation of poli-
tical association (Vereinsgesetz) which was intended to drive a wedge 
between capital and labour in its efforts to deter a possible alliance 
between the two which would have brought an end to Junker-Prussian 
rule. As it is clear from his approach, Schulze-Gaevernitz thought that the 
most important aim of German state affairs was to win the support of 
labour for political union, and that for this purpose a liberal administra-
tion was prerequisite. Thus he naturally came to criticize bitterly that 
such a prerequisite was prevented by the implementation of "Sammlungs-
politik "20). 
(d) Therefore, Schulze-Gaevernitz eagerly pushed ahead an anti-
Junker line based on a labour-civilian tie-up in the implementation of 
a trade policy that guaranteed German advance into the world market 
as well as in the establishment of a liberal domestic administration par-
ticularly in the solution of the problems of labour and agriculture; and 
at the same time he wanted to create the internal administrative basis 
for the materialization of a naval policy which had historic character as 
a "bourgeois-industrial movement "21l and which, for him, constituted a 
national problem. In this connection his greatest concern was to over-
throw Junker-Prussian rule. For that purpose he presented the problem 
of land reform in East Elbe and pointed out that the first step in a pro-
peasant policy must be taken against the entailed estate (Fideikommiss) 
system. It is thus worth paying sufficient attention to his warning issued 
against the tendency towards so-called " J unkerization of the bourgeoisie 
(Verjunkerung der Bourgeoisie) ""l which is alien to the inherent bour-
geois interests, as well as against the so-called "feudalization of bour-
geois class (Feudalisierung des Biirgertums) "23l. 
1 9) Ibid., S. 26 f. 
20) Ibid., S. 28. 
21) G. W. F. Hallgarten, op. cit., Bd. I, S. 384. 
22) O. Stillich, op. cit., S. 105. 
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(2) (a) Max Weber, Professor of Heidelberg University, gave a 
lecture in Mannheim in December 1897 on the subject of the" Historical 
Position of Modern Capitalism", in which he said that the time was 
approaching rapidly when the division of the world market would find 
its consummation in the Asian market, and that when such time came, 
nothing could have decisive influence in the overseas market but power 
or unreserved violence"!' and by so saying he presented his cool-headed 
recognition of the realities of the stage of world history in his time. 
Towards the end of the same year he again raised his bitter criticism 
against "Sammlungspolitik" in his answer to the "Flottenumfrage", 
enquete made in connection with the bill of the 1 st Fleet building. 
He first pointed out that despite the time when" power alone makes 
the ultimate decision as to the extent of the share allowed in the economic 
domination on earth" was so quickly approaching, a wide circle of south-
west German bourgeoisie was fatally lacking in recognition of realities, 
and he attributed this partly to the half-absolute monarchy and partly 
to the half-patriarchal German governmental system in the past 20 years 
which then came to be further distorted by the vulgar fear of the Red 
Monster, and consequently degraded into something antagonistic to national 
political education2~). He further stressed that the ultimate and the only 
possible economic policy in the age of capitalism, whether people like 
or detest it, was to be found in the thorough pursuance of the logical 
consequences of bourgeois-industrial development, and not in the compla-
cent policy of the so-called" Sammlung" carried out under anti-capital-
istic slogans. Thus though he attached a significance to the demand 
for the commanding maritime power for the sake of the bourgeois class, 
he insisted that no fleet was necessary if it was for the protection of 
rent"J. 
Max Weber, here, with his unique insight into the social structure 
of Imperial Germany, sharply focused his attention on the contradictions 
inherent in the "Sammlungspolitik", saying it is only through the 
establishment of a free internal government administration able to put 
an end to Junker-Prussian rule by replacing the economic policy obsessed 
with an empty agricultural phrase of omnipotence by determined pursuit 
of various logical consequences of bourgeois-industrial development that the 
implementation of naval policy comes to assume its significance, and 
23) Friedrich Zunkel, Der Rlwinisch-WestfiJ·lische Unternehmer 18'34-1879, 1962, S. 249. 
24) Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920, 1959, S. 87. 
25) Stellungsnahme zur Flottenumfrage der Munchener Allgerneinen Zeitung, Ausserordentliche 
Beilage Nr. 3 der Allgemeien Zeitung vom 13. Januar 1898, in W. J. Mommsen, op. cit .. 
Anhang I, S. 420f. 
26) Ibid., S. 421. 
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his criticism was directed to the wide circle of the south-west German 
bourgeoisie who failed to recognize such basic facts. 
(b) Now, in the circle of bourgeoisie who too,k the lead in the 
"anti-Uniting Policy (Gegensammlung)" in support of the line of the 
Radical Union as in the case of Schulze-Gaevernitz, what sort of 
viewpoints were presented as their criticism of "Sammlungspolitik " ? 
(1) Emil Rathenau of A. E. G. Konzern, a monopoly-capital electri-
cal machinery firm, in his answer to "Flottenumfrage" or enquete con-
cerning fleet building made by Miinchener Allgemeine Zeitung, said "a 
powerful fleet not only serves to elevate the German political position, 
but also to raise her position in the world market "27). But he added, " in 
the current circumstances it is trade that is indispensable for the fleet 
rather than the fleet being indispensable for trade" and further said, 
"before having a powerful fleet, affluent industries and prosperous 
commerce must take priority ",--" for several years those representing 
the agricultural interests have been demanding artificial restrictions on 
the activity of commerce and industry, as is indicated by the protective 
principles employed for concluding commercial treaties, for the law of 
trade association and the exchange law, etc. in their efforts to balance 
off the natural limitation of the productive capacity existing in the soil; 
however, it is absurd and nonsensical to try to protect our commerce 
and industry with arms from external threat when it is hit and wounded 
by laws at home "28). So saying, he pointed out the urgent necessity of 
a thorough implementation of economic policy in support of bourgeois 
interests. 
(2) Georg von Siemens who had been responsible for managing 
Deutsche Bank and the President of the Society of Commercial Treaty 
of which Emil Rathenau was also a member, also actively went against 
high agricultural protective tariffs as an Imperial Diet-member of the 
Radical Union based on the anti-Junker line. In May of 1901 when he 
gave a lecture in Magdeburg on the standpoint of his Society he accused 
the alliance of Agrariertum and heavy industry that interrupted the sign-
ing of commercial treaty by pursuing a protective tariff policy for the 
agro-industrial complex under the guidance of the Central Association 
of German Industrialists CZentralverband deutscher Industrieller). The 
points of his criticism of "Sammlunspolitik" can be summarised into two 
as follows: 
The first is that the main German agricultural product is no longer 
27) E. Kehr, Schlachtjiottenbau, S. 212. 
28) Ibid., S. 435. 
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corn but meat, and the demand of the Agrarier for high protective tariffs 
on corn not only results in price rises of foods, but harms the vast inter-
ests of the peasantry who raise cattle. The other is that import tariffs 
on industrial products protect only heavy industry, while the light and 
processing industries that employ the majority of the German working 
people are placed in a predicament by rises in price of necessary mate-
rials entailed by the heavier import duties on industrial goods and by 
that of foods caused by the protective tariff on corn. 
From such viewpoint Siemens announced") their intention to form a 
wide front, apart from supporting any specific political party, for the 
sake of the "Magenfrage "SO) (question of stomach) of the people in 
support of the continuance of the current commercial treaty or the 
policy of "Der neue Kurs" of Caprivi. However the interests of light 
and processing industries for export come to the front against the 
alliance between the Agrariertum and heavy industry, and nothing is 
done about the land issue that questions the big landownership in East 
Elbe which constituted the social foundation of Imperial Germany. In 
this connection it is considered that there is a basic difference between 
the viewpoint of Rathenau or Siemens and that of Schulze-Gaevernitz 
or Weber. 
(3) (a) Now the line of "Sammlungspolitik ", was successfully 
achieved by the majority parties of the Reichstag such as the Conserva-
tive Party, Imperialist Party, National Liberal Party, etc., when they 
passed the reformation tariff bill in 1902 by ousting the move of " Gegen-
sammlung" of the Social Democratic Party, Radical Union and Radical 
People's Party, etc. The problem of promoting an anti-Junker line by 
labour-civilian tie-up was presented anew when Theodor Mommsen who 
became the President of Berlin University in 1874 and a worthy opponent 
of Bismarck during 1881-'84 as an Imperial Diet-member of the separated 
fraction of National Liberal Party, made a pathetic request which could 
be considered as his last injunction. 
In December 1902, in the midst of the deliberation of the tariff bill 
by the 3 rd reading of the Reichstag when the fixing of minimum tariffs 
of 55 marks per ton of wheat, 50 marks per ton of rye and oats and 40 
marks per ton of barley was proposed by Herold of the Center Party 
supported by the congressional majority, and when the tariff reformation 
was about to be enforced in the way still more reactionary than the 
government draft turning down the opposition raised by the left and 
29) Rede des Reichstagsabgeordneten Dr. G. v. Siemens, Vorsitzenden des HandeIsvertragsvereins, 
gehalten am 8. Mai 1901 zu Magdeburg, 1901, SS. 9-14. 
30) Ibid., S. 14. 
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right wings such as the Social Democratic Party, Radical People's Party, 
Radical Union and Farmers' League, Mommsen made public an essay 
under the title of "What can still save us" in the journal "Die 
Nation". In this, he warned that Germans were standing at a starting 
point, not at a terminal of a coup d'etat where the Kaiser of Germany 
and the Reichstag surrendered to the absolutism of the alliance of mutual 
interests between Junkerdom and chaplain ruling">' and appealed that if 
there were a way out of this coup d'etat, it must be through riothing else 
but union among all political parties, including the Social Democratic 
Party, who are not taking part in this treason, saying" nothing is more 
necessitated at this critical and serious moment than to have co-opera-
tion between liberals who are still qualified to call themselves such and 
the labour party .... for this purpose on both sides conversion and 
reversion are necessary "32). 
This deeply involves his criticism of the deviation of the bourgeoisie, 
that had originally to be the torchbearer of bourgeois liberalism, towards 
a pro-Junker line as was illustrated by the camp belonging to the right 
wing of the National Liberal Party or to the Imperialist Party who push-
ed ahead" Sammlungspolitik ". 
(b) Then what had caused such deviation by the bourgeoisie towards 
a pro-Junker line and brought about an inherent pattern of "Junkeriza-
tion of bourgeoisie" or "feudalization of bourgeois class"? It was 
Weber coming to face the so-called" new phase of production "33) who 
made a sharp analysis of the causes. Weber, in his criticism of the bill 
of "Familienfideikommisse", not only made a severe attack on the pro-
pensity of the bourgeoisie to seek Nobilitierung (ennoblement) by setting 
up Fideikommisse, but also disclosed the Imperial German economic 
policy that fostered and spread such propensity as well as the historical 
characteristics of its authoritative-hierarchal social structure. Thus he 
traced back to the basic cause that produced a pro-Junker line on the 
part of the bourgeoisie. To Weber, the bill of" Familienfideikommisse" 
was a typical case where the efforts of conservatives were used for break-
ing up the united front of bourgeois class against the big landownership 
of East Elbe"J. In 1904 he published a labourious work" Agrostatistical-
Socialpolitical Observation for the Problem of Entailed Estate in Prussia", 
in which he criticized Prussian land policy that aimed to fortify Junker-
31) Th. Mommscn, "Was uns noch retten kann ", Die Nation, Jg. 20, Nr. 11, in Lujo M. 
Hartmann, TluodiJr Mommsen, 1908, S. 255. 
32) Ibid., S. 257. 
33) Marianne Weber, Max IVeber, 1950, SS. 316, 372' f, translation by K. Ohkubo, Misuzu 
Shobo, pp. 221, 257. 
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Prussian rule by expediting the Nobilitierung of bourgeoisie through the 
establishment of Fideikommisse as well as the bourgeoisie themselves who 
intended to climb up to the Briefadel (nobility obtained by letters pa-
tent) along such lines. At the same time he probed to the bottom that 
the content of the bill of "Familienfideikommisse" in Prussia was in 
complete contradiction to the promotion of domestic colonial policy35). 
The matter of concern for Weber was the reorganization of the social 
structure of Imperial Germany that tried to maintain Junker-Prussian 
rule as well as the land reform in East Elbe by pushing ahead domestic 
colonial policy. Since dissolution of Junkerdom, as the supplying source 
of military and beaurocratic forces that were mainstays of the state 
power of Imperial Germany''', could alone be the basis for the -reorganiza-
tion, he made thorough inquiries that the bill would pave the way to 
the establishment of Fideikommisse. If the best land were to be placed 
at the disposal of the vanity and control of "agrocapitalism ""l, it came 
to be direct contradiction of the formation of peasantry by domestic 
colonial policy. 
(4) So far some observations have been made as to the basic ap-
proach of criticism of "Sammlungspolitik" by the circle of the Radical 
Union. Though quite a difference can be seen between the approaches, 
one common basis that we cannot overlook, exists. That is, an antago-
nism between the old type-bourgeoisie that tried to create a domestic 
governmental foundation of "Junker-Bourgeois imperialism" through 
implementation of "Sammlungspolitik" to cope with the new situation 
developed as German capitalism shifted to highly monopolistic capitalism, 
and the new type-bourgeoisie who pressed the anti-Junker line of labour-
civilian tie-up in their belief that the establishment of a liberal domestic 
governmental foundation that enabled the achievement of bourgeois inter-
ests was prerequisite. The ole type-bourgeoisie was a stubborn advoca-
tor of subordinate labour relations") based on "Herr-im-Hause-Standpun-
kt" which could be compared to the Junker rule in Gutsbezirk (mano-
rial district) of East Elbe, supporting the anti-subversion bill (Umsturz-
vorlage), the political association bill (Vereinsgesetz), the imprisonment 
bill (Zuchthausvorlage), etc. and was an oppressor of civil liberties such 
34) W. J. Mommsen, op. cil., S. 110. 
35) M. Weber, Agrarstatistische und sozialpolitische Betra.chtungen zur Fideikommissfrage in 
Preussen (1904), in Gesam ... lle Aufsiil.e -<ur So"iologie und So<ialpolitik, 1924, SS. 323-393. 
36) K. Swniya, "Max Weber as an Editor of Grundriss der Sozialokonomik ", Shiso, No. 10, 
1963, p. 66. 
37) M. Weber, op. cit .• S. 393. 
38) K. Ohkouchi. op. cit., p. 587; E. Ohno, On History of German Finance-Capital Formation, 
Yuhikaku, 1956. pp. 188-189, 232. 
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as the right of organisation of labour, rights of assembly and political 
organisation, etc. In contrast with this, new type-bourgeoisie, with their 
concern with "quality labour" CQualitiitsarbeit)") and going against the 
"Herr-im-Hause-Standpunkt", tried to create independent, rational labour 
relations that could cultivate the quality of labour, and demanded the 
establishment of a domestic administration free from Junker-Prussian 
rule. Thus the two antagonistic patterns of the bourgeoisie: the one, 
the old type-bourgeoisie that aimed to protect their own interests jointly 
with the Junker class in the face of the growing strength of the prole-
tariat, and the other, the new type-bourgeoisie that intended a tie-up 
with labour and civilians to be freed from Junker-Prussian control. Such 
antagonism was the undercurrent of the circle of the Radical Union who 
raised criticism against the driving force of "Sammlungspolitik ". 
Further the criticism of the circle of the Radical Union directed at 
"the intention of social ascension "40) of the upper stratum of bourgeoisie 
who converted themselves upward to be a bulwark of Junker-Prussian 
rule by submitting their own bourgeois interests to the latter as an inte-
gral part of Imperial German social structure, went beyond the frame of 
comments upon current problems and rightly hit upon the typical nature 
of the bourgeoisie that gradually gained weight in the Imperial social 
structure and that came to be highlighted through the withdrawal of 
Bismarck. The understanding of this aspect is particularly necessary 
when the historical nature of the rule of German monopoly-capital or 
finance-captial at the turn of the 19th century is questioned"). 
In order to deepen our understanding of the typical nature of such 
German bourgeoisie, this paper makes some analysis of the Prussian sta-
tistics regarding the establishment of "Fideikommisse", a mainstay for 
the realization of "the intention of social ascension" by the bourgeoisie. 
39) O. Stillich, op. cit., S. 127. 
40) F. Zunkel, op. cit., S. lOB. 
41) For example, when Prof. K. Ohkouchi said U After Bismarck's withdrawal in 1890 from 
the stage where a drama of compromise between Junker and the newly developing capital 
power, the political advance of the capital power gradually gained ground but behind this 
process ...... there were such hidden facts as the transfonnation of Gennan capitalism to 
imperialism from the 1890's to the beginning of the 20th century, the establishment of the 
ruling power by monopoly-capital, as the economic foundation of the fonner, namely the 
achievement of supremacy by Rhineland heavy industrial capital" (ibid., p. 3B7) or when 
Prof. K. Hayashi said that the conversion from U old era" (ihid., p. 46) as illustrated by the 
Bismarck tied with old type financial capitalist BleichrOder to .. new era U as indicated by 
.. Whilhelm II who joined his hands with new Konzem like Krupp" (ibid., pp. 52-53) had 
a certain internal relation with the change in the nature of Gennan capitalistic society, the 
historical nature of the rule of monopoly-capital or finance-capital as comprehended as 
II newly developed Konzern like Krupp" must be studied in the perspective of Imperial 
Gennan social structure; and the problem lies at this very JX>int. 
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m Typical Characteristics of GerlDan Bourgeoisie 
-In Light o~ the Analysis of the Statistics of Fideikommisse in Prussia-
(1) When one takes a look at the statistics of Fideikommisse In 
Prussia (Table 1), attention is called first to the increase trend in the 
number of Fideikommisse and their total area. The ratio of total area 
of Fideikommisse as against that of Prussia had remarkably increased 
from 4.5 % at the end of 1870 to 7.3 % at the end of 1918 under the 
Imperial German regime of about half a century. The total area" of 
.about 2,530,000 hectares of Fideikommisse at the end of 1918 was almost 
as large as that of the Westprussian province. When such increase trend 
of Fedeikommisse is examined according to the year of its establishment, 
in parallel with the establishment of old Fideikommisse such as those con-
verted from Lehnsgut (estate in fee) which were mostly situated in 
purely remote agrarian regions, we notice that there were remarkably 
numerous cases of the establishment of new Fideikommisse in the superior 
area in proximity to markets42l, during the time when German capitalistic 
society advanced to the stage of highly monopolistic capitalism through 
industrial revolution. 
Whereas the conversion of Lehnsgut to Fideikommisse (Table 4) regis-
tered particularly large numbers by the middle of the 19th century and 
<luring the 1880's, and it was almost completed by the end of 1880's, the 
establishment of new Fideikommisse (Table 2 and 4) increased after the 
1880's and their number registered sharp increase particularly during the 
10 years from the beginning of the 20th century. 
It was not altogether incidental that the cases of establishment of 
new Fideikommisse showed sharp increase during the period when that 
«empty agricultural phrase" had controlled economic policy since the 
protective tariff policy was adopted by the alliance of "Corn and Iron" 
in 1879. In other words, the establishment of Fideikommisse tremendously 
increased riding on the high tide of the conservative current and was 
further expedited by the Imperial German economic policy. As, for exam-
ple, Max Weber stated" Our all economic policies foster Rentner (rent-
ier') and the tendency to enable to secure otium cum dignitate by 
the bourgeois capital investment in land will rapidly gain its ground 
with further satiation of German capital possession and with the widened 
mutual isolation by protective closed policy among various countries "43), 
the economic policy of Imperial Germany accelerated capital excess by 
42) M Weber, op. cit.,S. 330. 
43) Ibid., S. 372 Awn. 
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Table I, Fideikommisse in Prussia 
Ratio of Total Ratio of Agri- Ratio of Wo-
Total Area of Area of Fidei. culural Area oded Area of End of Number of Fideikommisse kommisse as of Fideikom- Fideikommisse Year Fideikommisse (1,000 ha) against that of misse as aga. against that of inst that of Prussia Prussia Prussia 
1850 519 1,249 
- - -
1860 609 1,424 - - -
1870 707 1,564 4.50/0 - -
1880 817 1,761 5.1 - -
1890 981 1,953 5.6 - -
1895 1,045 2,122 6.1 4.40/0 11.90/0 
1900 
-
2,198 6.3 - 12.1 
1905 - 2,260 6.5 - 12.6 
1910 1,251 2,407 6.9 - 13.6 
1912 1,277 2,449 7.0 4.9 13.8 
1914 1,311 2,467 7.1 5.0 13.5 
1918 1,348 2,531 7.3 5.1 13.9 
c. v. Dietze, Fideikommisse, in Handworterhuch de, StDJJtswissenscluzjten, 4. Aufl., 
Bd. 3, 1926, S. 998. 
Table 2. Establishment of Fideikommisse in Prussia 
Years of Numbers of I 0/0 I Yearly 
II 
Present Area I 0/0 I Average Area Establishment Establishment Mean 
To 1850 516 40.4 - 1,245,441 ha 50.9 2,414 ha 
1851-1860 88 6.9 8.8 174,235 7.1 1,980 
1861-1870 96 7.5 9.6 140,388 5.7 1,462 
1871-1880 103 8.1 10.3 184,567 7.5 1,792 
1881-1890 163 12.8 16.3 191,858 7.8 1,177 
1891-1895 56} 117 4.4} 11.2 125,633 5.1 2,243 9.2 
1896-1900 61 4.8 12.2 78,833 3.2 1,292 
1901-1905 59}161 4.6} 12.6 11.8 102,220 4.2 1,733 
1906-1910 102 8.0 20.4 157,341 6.4 1,543 
1911-1912 33 2.6 16.5 48,710 2.0 1,476 
Total to 1912 I 1,277 I 100.0 I II 2,449,226 I 100.0 I 1,918 
H. Hoepker, .. Die FldclkommlS5e m Preusscn 1m Lichte der Statistik bis zum Bnde 
des Jahres 1912 ", Zeitschrijt des koniglich p,eussischen stalistischen Landesamts, Jg. 
54, 1914, S. 49, 
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Table 3. Scale aud Distribution of Fideikommisse in Prussia at the End of 1912 
State I (I) Total Area of 1 (II) Area of 1 (II) I R;jtio of Wo-
Provinces State or Province Fideikommisse % = ----en- ~. ~d. kArea ?f 1 el omnusse 
A State 
B Provinces 
34,880,133.7 ha 2,449,225.6 ha 7.0 46.6% 
I Ostpreussen 3,700,163.3 146,887.5 4.0 29.3 
II Westpreussen 2,555,795.5 118,091.2 4.6 42.6 
III Stadtkreis Berlin 6,341.5 - - -
IV Brandenburg 3,984,400.7 343,294.6 8.6 52.3 
V Pommern 3,013,406.8 248,301.2 8.2 28.2 
VI Posen 2,899,373.8 206,967.4 7.1 36.5 
VII Schlesien 4,033,768.0 698,107.2 17.3 57.0 
VIII Sachsen 2,526,947.5 127,025.4 5.0 41.4 
IX Schleswig-Holstein 1,901,891.8 141,728.5 7.5 19.5 
X Hannover 3,851,133.0 82,211.2 2.1 46.4 
XI Westfalen 2,022,260.8 157,629.8 7.8 58.7 
XII Hessen.Nassau 1,570,233.9 78,540.5 5.0 65.8 
XIII Rheinprovinz 2,700,193.1 81,649.6 3.0 57.4 
XIV Hohenzollernsche Lande 114,224.0 18,791.5 16.5 77.8 
H. Hoepker, op. CIt., S. 10 f. 
Table 4. Establishment.Numbers of Fideikommisse in Prussia (Parenthesized Numbers 
Indicate the Nwnbers of the Conversion of Lehnsgtiter to Fideikommisse) 
State 
1 
To I T 118511186111871 1 1881 11891 r896119011190611911 
Provinces 1912 18~0 18~0 18/70 18~0 18~0 18~5 19~0 19~51dlO Idl2 
A State 1,277(249) 516(79) 88(21) 96(21)1103(43) 163(74) 56 (9)[61 59(2)[102 33 
B Provinces 117(9) 161 (2) 
I Ostpreussen 75 (16) 24 (7) 5 (2) 12 (2) I (I) 12 (4) 3 4 4 8 2 
II Westpreussen 35 (2) 9 (I) 3 2 (I) - 2 I I 5 9 3 
III Stadtkreis Berlin 
- - - - - - - - -
-
-
IV Brandenburg 138 (35) 43 (2) 8 (I) 9 16(1l) 26(13) II (6) 4 7(2) 12 2 
V Pommern 125 (38) 35 (7) 10 (2) 8 (6) 22(15) 16 (7) 10 (I) 5 6 7 6 
VI Posen 76 3 4 7 9 5 5 6 5 28 4 
VII Schlesien 213 (23) 85 (9) 7 14 (4) 12 (5) 30 (4) 7 (I) 15 13 21 9 
VIII Sacbsen 141 (73) 26(10) II (5) 6 (2) 19(10) 57(45) 7 (I) 4 6 3 2 
IX Schleswig-Holstein 78 (9) 52 (8) 4 (1) 3 5 2 1 4 4 2 I 
X Harmover 138 (28) 89(19) 11 (5) 16 (3) 5 2 (I) 5 4 3 3 -
XI W estf alen 102 (4) 77 (4) 3 4 4 3 1 5 I 3 1 
XII Hessen-Nassau 107 (19) 49(10) 17 (5) 13 (3) 7 (1) 5 2 7 3 ~ -
XIII Rheinprovinz 43 (2) 18 (2) 5 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 
XIV Hohenzollernsche Lande 6 6 - - - - - - - - -
H. Hoepker, op. cit., 88. 3B-43. 
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restricting the field of capital investment on the one hand and by protecting 
" corn" raised the rent of superior land, particularly wheat land on the 
other and consequently submitted such wheat land to the wider land 
restriction by Fideikommisse. 
Now if the specific feature in the increase trend of Fideikommisse as 
examined above is further examined on a provincial scale (Table 4), estab-
lishment of new Fideikommisse was widespread during 1880-'90 and 
1901-'10 in the provinces of Silesia which was called the "classic country 
of Fideikommisse ,,«) and Brandenburg, while in Posen province the number 
established was overwhelmingly concentrated during 10 years from 1901 
and in other provinces such as Westprussia and Eastprussia the case is 
the same. 
Thus the area of Fideikommisse at the end of 1912 (Table 3) occupied 
17.3 % of the total area of Silesia province, 8.6 % of Brandenburg province 
and not only in the East Elbe but also in the West Elbe the high per-
centage of 7.8 as in the province of Westfalia was occupied thereby. 
The establishment of Fideikommisse in Prussia was banned by Article 
38 of the Constitution granted by Prussian King in 1848 in the midst of the 
stormy "March Revolution", but with the victory of counterrevolution 
the Article of the Constitution which stipulated the abolition of Fidei-
kommisse, was deleted by the law of 1852'" and in reverted to the status 
prior to the "March Revolution". Later, in keeping up with the pro-
gress of German capitalism, the establishment of Fideikommisse showed 
an increase trend and besides, its trend was extended from East Elbe to 
many parts of West Elbe. It is not difficult to infer that such a pheno-
menon had a certain inner relation to the progress pattern of German 
capitalistic society that enabled the continuance of socially favourable 
treatment of landownership or with historical nature of her social struc-
ture and that the hope for ascension of bourgeoisie to the status of Brief-
adel through establishment of Fideikommisse played no small role there-
in. Max Weber, in this connection, saw into the inherent nature of 
the affair saying" the tendency of land acquisition by bourgeois capital 
is no longer limited to the east, but is already a universal tendency, and 
it can be weakened only when the socially favourable treatment of 
landownership disappears "<S). He further pointed out that the economic 
policy of Imperial Germany was further accelerating the tendency in 
44) Ibid., S. 343 Anrn. 
45) Vgl. Franz Horsten, Die Familien-Fideikommiss-Politik in Preusse., 1924, S. 2911'. ; A. Yamada, 
Fomuztion Process of Modem Landownership, Yushindo, 1958, p. 174f. 
46) M. Weber, op. cit., S. 359 Anm. Further refer to Lysbeth Walker Muncy, The Junker, In 
the Prussi .. Administration under William II, 1884-1914, 1944, p. 26, where she describes the 
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East Elbe and was likely to transplant it into West Elbe. 
(2) When this tendency is examined in the light of the movement 
of the bourgeoisie in Rhine-Westfalia, it is obvious that the collapse of 
the" March Revolution" played a major role in inviting such a turning-
point. 
(a) Though in the "pre-March period" "the intention of social 
ascension" was noticed among bourgeoisie who owned knights' estates 
(Rittergliter)or some wealthy entrepreneurs, it was still an individual phe-
nomenon, and in the days of moral uplifting in the movement of bour. 
geois-liberal emancipation such intention was regarded as a breach of 
faith against political and social attitudes to be assumed by the bourgeois 
class and was bitterly criticized by Gustav Mevissen and others. Con-
sequently such intention was considered as that of an "egoistic outsider,,47). 
(b) However, with the collapse of the" March Revolution" and in 
the midst of the industrial rise during the 1850's, "the intention of social 
ascension" among entrepreneurs of Rhine-Westfalia gradually became a 
collective phenomenon, and with Prussian victories in the Prusso-Austrian 
War in 1866 and in the Prusso-French War of 1870-'71 and with the 
achievement of German unification under Prussian leadership, the recon-
cilliation of entrepreneurs of Rhine-Westfalia to Junker-Prussian rule and 
their integration into the authoritative-hierarchal social structure of 
Imperial Germany had decidedly advanced. "In the bourgeois class of 
Rhine-Westfalia "--as in the middle classes all over Germany--the 
great national success of the government and the ruling class made it 
possible to subjugate social strata consisting of primarily small and middle 
manufacturers, merchants, middle-class officials, and national school tea-
chers, to authoritative and monarchical political rule and to integrate 
them into the hierarchy of Prussian society and all these middle classes 
(Mittelstand) entirely abandoned the resistance against the system and 
way of life of the nobility", said Friedrich Zunkel"). 
(c) Before the birth of the new German empire, because of the 
resistance by the old nobility to the "swollen Briefadel "49) and also thanks 
to the control of the Prussian King who gave priority to the military 
officers and government officials, the ascension to Briefadel of Rhine-
land manufacturers and bankers was very limited while the ennoble-
ment of bourgeoisie was centered in Berlin rather than in the west. 
situation toward the end of 19 th century when U bourgeois merchants and industrialists" 
were extensively gaining the knights' estates (Rittergi.iter) for soclo-economic reasons. 
47) F. Zunkel, op. cit., S. 108. 
48) Ibid., S. 130. 
49) Ibid., S. 121. 
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Besides, the weight was particularly placed on the bankers in Berlin who 
had financial ties with the government or high-ranking officials. However 
after the foundation of the empire, particularly since the beginning of 
1880's, ennoblement of many entrepreneurs was made by the policy of 
Bismarck intended to absorb the leading industrial and financial circles 
into the side of state interests, driving a wedge into bourgeois liberalism; 
thus to many entrepreneurs hailing from Rhine-Westfalia ennoblement 
was granted. That Mevissen, once a radical critic of the "intention of 
social ascension" of the bourgeoisie, as a brain of the Rhine bourgeoisie, 
belonged to the Free Conservative Party inaugurated in 1867 by Mag-
naten (magnates) of Silesia, for the purpose of firmly maintaining "the 
foundation of military-beaurocratic state of Prussia ""l, and later in 1884 
was ennobled5l); or that in 1887, after the death of Alfred Krupp, all assets 
left by him was fixed into Fideikommiss, etc.52J, all these symbolically 
account for what has been mentioned above. 
(3) In the above, the reason why the phenomenon of the so-called 
"Feudalization or Junkerization" of the bourgeoisie had quickly spread 
with the emergence of Imperial Germany was outlined, and now if the 
distribution of Fideikommisse, a mainstay by which the bourgeoisie came 
to hope for "social ascension" is examined by reference to the statis-
tics (Table 5) arranged according to the class of proprietor and scale in 
Prussia each at the end of 1895, 1903, 1912, then it is found out that 
the "other nobility" became a majority in 1912, numbering 664 persons 
(57.2 %), and the growth in this category was most conspicuous, while 
the "bourgeois class" too showed remarkable increase in the number of 
Fideikommisse proprietors from 90 persons (9.6 %) in 1895 to 110 (10.6 %) 
in 1903, and further to 136 (11.7 %) in 1912. As H. Hoepker rightly 
pointed out saying, "quite often the bourgeois who owns Fideikommiss 
is ennobled, therefore, those owing Fideikommisse who ascend into 'other 
no bility , deviating from 'the last group' should not be overlooked "53), 
it must be sufficiently recognized that the group of "other nobility" 
comprehends a great number of "new nobility (Neuadel) "54) of ennobled 
bourgeoisie. At any rate through the transition in the proprietors of 
Fideikommisse such as "other nobility" and" bourgeois" it can be easily 
understood that there was a sharp increase of "new nobility", and the 
50) Johannes Ziekursch, Hundert Jahre schlesi.scher Agrargeschichte, 1915, S. 391. 
51) Joseph Hansen, Gustav von Mevissen, Ein rheinischer Lebensbild 1815-1899, Bd. "1, 1906, S. 841. 
52) Rudolf Keibel. "Aus Hundert Jabren deutscher Eisen- und Stablindustrie", Schmollers Jahr-
bu,h, Jg. 38, 1914, S. 897. . 
. 53) H. -Hdepkcr, .. Die Fideikommissc in Preussen ,in Lichte der Statistik bis zum Ende des 
Jahre, 1912", Zeitschrift des kiiniglich preussischen statistischen Landesamts, Jg. 54, 1914, S. 51. 
54) F. Zunkel, op. cit., S. 132. 
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Classes of Proprietol1l 100 ha 100-200 ha 200-500 ha 
Number~ Area Number! Area Number: Area Number! Area 
h. h. h. h. 
r
895 939 :2,121,412 83 3,645 50 7,063 149 51,070 
State 1903 1,034 ;2,197,111 97 4,107 51 7,309 167 57,130 
1912 1,160 '2,449,226 108 4,704 57 8,361 184 65,236 
Classes of Proprietors I II I I 
f895 
23 204,077 1 30 2 266 1 216 
I Royal Family 1903 24 194,188 1 52 2 266 1 216 
1912 25 227,941 2 107 3 455 - -
f895 
41 326'8~ I 57 I 101 4 , 1,437 
II Standesherr 1903 37 286,538 1 , 57 1 : 101 3 825 
1912 37 291,511 1 57 2 281 2 562 
f895 
20 : 229,7611 -, - - : - 2 : 697 
III FUl1It 1903 27 266,4411 - - -
• 
- ~ • 697 1912 29 • 276, 799~ -, - - - 697 
f895 
240 • 733,866 3 128 3 453 18 6,631 
IV Graf 1903 251 • 760,669 3 105 3 453 18 6,675 
1912 269 825,621 4 165 4 724 19 7,582 
f895 
525 589,043 38 1,970 27 3,882 113 38,405 
V Other 1903 585 642,807 44 2,145 30 4,500 127 43,434 Nobility 




90 37,821 1 40 1,460 17 2,361 11 3,684 
VI Bourgeois 1903 110 46,468 48 1,748 15 1,989 16 5,283 , 
1912 136 53,4061 60 2,260 16 2,179 23 : 8,131 
., ' 
"DIe FldelkomrUlsse In Preussen am Ende des Jahres 1895 ", Zettsthn/t des konzglzch 
Preussen am Ende des Jahres 1903", Zeitschrift des kiiniglich preussischen statist is chen 
emergence of such "swollen Briefadel" in the Imperial Germany entailed 
the extensive reshuffle in blood-relation among nobility classes and thus 
brought about reorganization of the ruling class. This was implied by 
Zunkel when he said" the old Prussian ruling class has thus come to be 
ousted in the new empire by the elite of aristocratic and yet bourgeois 
entrepreneurs as well as by that of agricultural and yet industrial entre-
preneurs, from whom emerged the real representatives of the imperialism 
and nationalism of the young German empire "55J. 
This" new nobility" is the very class that came to prominence with 
55) Ibid., S. 132. 
GERMAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN TRANSITION 
to the Class of Proprietor and Scale in Prussia 
,. Herrschaften " " Latif undien " 
500-1,000 ha 1,000-2,000 ha 1 2,000-5,000 ha 5,000-1~,000 ha 110,000 ~ above 
, 
Number: Area Number: Area Numberi Area Number, Area Number: Area 
h. b. h. h. h. 
196 ' 144,186 204 ' 293,613 164 • 491,067 59 412,775 34 ' 717,993 
210 ' 154,526 228 ' 322,181 187 ~ 558,677 60 404,583 34 ' 688,598 
227 ~ 166,566 276 , 392,190 207 • 622,090 64 422,463 38 ' 767,616 
I I I I , 
1 795 5 
, 
8,650 3 10,623 5 36,346 5 : 147,151 
1 795 4 6,677 4 12,929 5 33,380 6 : 139,873 
1 807 3 5,576 4 15,402 4 26,938 8 : 178,656 
2 1,357 9 13,702 6 , 20,698 8 58,344 10 : 231,148 
3 2,100 6 8,328 8 26,916 6 41,588 9 : 206,623 
1 580 7 10,064 9 31,387 6 42,023 9 ~ 206,557 
1 749 2 2,205 2 6,041 4 34,246 9 i 185,823 
1 749 2 2,204 7 22,432 6 44,458 9 
, 
195,901 
1 749 4 5,050 7 , 22,416 5 37,841 10 ' 210,046 
34 26,177 71 . 102,876 67 211,727 35 242,532 9 143,342 
36 27,961 68 97,670 76 237,536 38 254,597 9 , 135,672 
36 28,121 72 : 102,790 85 262,829 39 261,564 10 161,846 
151 109,782 105 '149,516 83 233,652 7 41,307 1 ~ 10,529 
155 113,085 135 1190,606 88 247,948 5 30,560 1 10,529 
170 : 123,382 173 245,846 100 285,011 9 . 54,097 1 , 10,511 





14 9,836 13 16,696 4 10,916 - - - -
18 12,927 17 22,864 2 5,045 - - - -
preussr.schen statutzschen Bureaus, Jg. 37, 1897, S. 15; F. KiJhnert, "DIe Fldelkommlsse In 
Landesamts, Jg. 45, 1905, S. 215; R. Roepker, op. cit., S. 33. 
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the withdrawal of Bismarck as a turning-point and was the driving force 
of "Sammlungspolitik" as led by Stumm of the Imperialist Party and 
Miquel who belonged to the right wing of the National Liberal Party. 
The reorganization of the ruling class was, of course, not what helped 
promote the collapse of Imperial German social structure, but was rather 
an indication of its being a bulwark of Junker-Prussian rule by integrat-
ing the upper stratum of bourgeoisie into the social structure as "new 
nobility", and was nothing but the intention of reinforcement of the 
ancien regime. We find thus the major pattern of the bourgeoisie of 
Imperial Germany in this" new nobility". 
